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ABSTRACT 
Recent technological innovations such as mobile computing have enabled new facility of buying and 
selling using mobile device.  While users welcome this, security risksi that can emerge due to this new 
facility raise concerns.  This exploratory research discusses the security risks in mobile computing in 
terms of direct risks and indirect risk.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The advent of mobile computing facilitates the mobility to research, communicate, and purchase 
goods and services from anywhere at anytime without being tied to a desktop. Using the Internet in 
conjunction with mobile computing opens up many more activities than merely online purchasing. 
For instance, mobile applications such as emails, weather reports, sport scores, flight and reservation 
information, navigational maps, and stock quotes are becoming common.  While the dominance of 
these applications is expected to grow, innovative online applications such as location identification 
programs will further drive new areas of mobile commerce growth. For instance, the Gartner Group 
estimated that by the end of this year (i.e. 2004), 40% of consumer-to-business e-commerce will be 
conducted over Web-enabled phones (Haskin, 1999).  Supporting argument for this can also be found 
in Deitel (2001).  It is also expected that by 2008, the number of wireless Internet devices will 
outnumber wired devices (Deitel & Deitel, 2001). 
The advent of e-commerce in conjunction with mobile devices has prompted the idea of mobile 
commerce, commonly known as m-commerce (Green, 2000).  The underlying architecture to support 
mobile communication is wireless application protocol (WAP).  The WAP provides a set of software 
instructions to communicate in a wireless environment with mobile devices as an interface.  To 
facilitate access to the number of services provided and those envisaged for the future, today’s mobile 
device consists of a full colour graphics display, touch screen, and an in-built Internet browser with an 
optional limited keypad.  The idea is to serve the customer better by providing up-to-date information 
anywhere, any time, anyhow using the mobile telephone (McConnel, 2000).   The basic advantage of 
m-commerce is its versatility and size (Redman, 2002).  Using the mobile devices, the technology 
facilitates access to information that is on-line and up-to-date.   
Mobile communication technology can be categorised into three generations.  The first generation of 
mobile communications was analogue.  The second generation used digital encoding.  These systems 
were used mainly for voice.  The third generation is designed for high-speed communication, which 
involves data transfer and voice.  This third generation will also support multimedia capabilities.  
Current m-commerce developments are at this stage (Schiller, 2000).   
Despite the technical growth, it appears the telecommunication companies have a stronghold on the 
development and implementation of the m-commerce (Stuart & Bawany, 2001).  The users will be 
able to access information with the telecommunication networks as a bridge to wired Internet services.  
Mobile device manufacturers and telecommunication companies have discussed a number of usage 
models using various protocols such as the “Bluetooth” jointly developed by Nokia, IBM, Ericsson, 
Intel and Toshiba.  These usage models enable end users to choose a device and access of their choice 
in order to perform mobile commerce oriented activities.  In recent months, these usage models also 
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have driven new applications for users.  Examples of these usage models in Australia include Optus 
Telecommunication network coupled with mobile telephones such as Siemens and Motorola.   
The objective of the paper is to provide a comprehensive discussion on security risks in mobile 
commerce.  To achieve this purpose, this paper developed a model taxonomy of security risks based 
on existing literature.  The need for security in m-commerce environment is established initially in 
this paper.  Then, taxonomy of security issues specific to m-commerce is provided.  The taxonomy is 
further discussed in terms of two major sub headings direct threats and indirect threats.  These two 
threats are discussed with a number of sub headings in detail to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of potential threats in m-commerce environment.  The paper is then concluded by 
providing some brief solutions.  
 
 
THE NEED FOR SECURITY IN M-COMMERCE 
 
Currently most mobile devices (laptops, WLANs, personal digital assistants (PDAs), etc) do not 
contain the same capabilities as mobile phones (e.g. Smart Cards to improve security, roaming to 
improve remote connectivity), thus limiting their use in wireless environments. The feasibility of 
combining these technologies for use in a specific setting will be dependent upon the security 
protocols.  It appears that the lack of security provision has created a barrier against the adoption of 
mobile commerce among users (Hu et al., 2002) and prior research in the area appear to have focussed 
predominantly on ‘wired’ environments (Colagiuiri, 1997) with little attention being afforded to the 
adoption of wireless technology in mobile commerce environment.  This is mainly due to the sensitive 
and critical nature of user information and the lack of security offered by wireless IEEE802.11x based 
systems in the past.  
While the size of mobile computing devices has been reduced in the recent years, the computing 
capacity that drives these devices has grown significantly. For instance, certain digital assistants come 
in smaller size and are capable of handling functions realised by word processors and spreadsheets.  In 
addition, these devices can also handle a calendar, an address book and a small size memo pad.  These 
were functions realised in a desktop computer a few years ago.  Today's handheld devices have 
computing power almost equivalent to their desktop-computing counterparts of only one generation 
earlier. This phenomenon, while driving more and more functionality into handheld wireless Internet-
enabled devices, is also driving security risks such as theft or loss of data specific to desktop 
computing into wireless devices, especially in the mobile computing applications arena.  Some of the 
security risks highlighted in the literature include identity theft and credit card frauds (Kuechler & 
Grupe, 2003). Therefore, it is believed that failing to provide a secure system will significantly 
dampen consumer adoption rates of mobile commerce (Fink, 2000).   
 
TAXONOMY OF SECURITY ISSUES 
 
Security appears to be assuming significant importance in the mobile commerce environment than a 
traditional electronic commerce environment because it is possible to eavesdrop into other’s message 
with minimum difficulty in mobile environment (Gururajan & Vuori, 2003).  In a connected medium, 
it is fairly difficult to penetrate networks that are secured.  Further, due to the hardware capability of 
devices, it is possible to package more security applications on to these desktop devices.  However, in 
a wireless environment, it is relatively easy to penetrate other devices because of the lack of security 
provided by certain wireless applications1 due to hardware limitations.  Therefore, the current 
architectures are trying to improve their design in terms of security.  This has an impact for consumers 
because they are concerned about their data and voice messages from unauthorised access and expect 
security for data as well as for voice. 
There are two major technical security concerns in a mobile commerce environment: identification 
integrity, and message integrity. The identification integrity refers to the signature elements found in 
the messages in order infer from where the message is originating.  The message integrity refers to 
details in order to establish that the message is received as sent and no third party has attempted to 
                                                 
1 Bluetooth provides a list of security issues in its discussion paper.  Refer to www.bluetooth.com for more details.  
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open, modify or alter the contents.  These two items appear to cause a lot of concern to both sender 
and receiver.  The sender risks theft or misuse of their personnel information such as account and 
bank details and the receiver (usually a merchant) risks repudiation of the transaction and resultant 
non-payment.  Data in mobile commerce environment is secured using encryption technology.  It has 
been proven that the technology is vulnerable to attacks.  Hackers have broken some of the existing 
algorithms for encryption.  So, there is nothing like a complete security.  The technical security threats 
can be categorised into threats that can impact data in a mobile commerce transaction environment, 
platform that facilitates this data communication and the software applications and protocols that are 
essential for such communication.  These technical security risks can directly affect mobile commerce 
and these are discussed as ‘direct security threats’.  In addition to these direct threats, threats related to 
privacy issues, regulatory enforcement etc. can affect mobile commerce indirectly and these are 
discussed as ‘indirect security threats’.  These two broad classifications are explored below as shown 
in the following diagram.   
 
 
Diagram 1: A snap shot of mobile commerce security risks 
 
DIRECT SECURITY THREATS 
 
Direct security threats are those that impact the users directly due to a technical issue, a data issue or a 
software application issue.  Users may find it inconvenient to perform a mobile commerce transaction 
due to this direct risk.  The data security risks specific to wireless computing would typically 
encompass malicious users, security problems with data exchange, loss or theft of devices, data 
security at transmission time, threat due to location identification and WAP Gap.  The platform 
security risks involve memory protection and access control.  The software risks involve software 
defects and scripting issues.  These are elaborated in the following paragraphs.  
 
Data Security Risks 
Malicious user 
In addition to the usual Internet security threats of online applications, wireless computing introduces 
new hazards specific to mobility and communication medium. The very nature of the wireless 
computing facilitates the formation of ad hoc networks for the purpose of communication (Dornan, 
2001).  Ad hoc networks are formed for a specific communication and once the purpose is over, 
abolished.  These ad hoc networks decentralise the decision-making processes because many such ad 
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hoc networks can be formed to take decisions.  Users participating in these ad hoc networks connect 
their wireless devices such as notebook computers equipped with wireless protocols for the purpose of 
data transfer & exchange and these users are referred to as ‘nodes’ in the ad hoc network (Zhang & 
Lee, 2000).  This decentralisation has resulted in network protocols that rely on cooperation among all 
participating devices.  In these circumstances, an adversary node can exploit this assumed trust to 
compromise security.  When such a security breach occurs, an adversary that compromises a single 
node can disseminate false routing information.  This may have a detrimental effect on the complete 
network and users connected to the network. In the worst case, this adversary can instruct all routing 
to go through the compromised node (Zhang & Lee, 2000).  Similarly, while mobile users roam 
through many different cells and ad hoc networks, the communication is handed off from one domain 
to the next.  At this point, a single malicious domain can potentially compromise wireless devices by 
facilitating malicious download of data or programs.  In certain cases, this may result in denial of 
service. 
The mobile computing medium provides excellent cover for malicious users because wireless devices 
roam in and out of wireless zones, have no fixed geographic point, and can go online and offline 
easily (Atwal, 2001). This enables the users to very quickly disconnect from the network and when 
this happens it is difficult to establish the physical location of the user.  Therefore, this ‘roaming’ 
makes it difficult to trace a mobile user.  As a result, users with mobile devices can launch attacks 
against fixed networks easily where tracing an attack becomes difficult.  Further, rather than an 
attacker needing to pursue a target, targets can come to attackers in wireless networks simply by 
roaming through the attacker's zone.  
Wireless connections can be easily compromised even without exploiting ad hoc networks at the 
transport layer level (Young, 2000). This layer of the network can be loosely seen as the vehicle that 
transports user identities.  For example, airline passengers who check their emails in airports during 
wait times using their mobile devices reveal their identity to the wireless networks.  A malicious 
attacker can easily identify the passenger’s details and can divert the passenger's web request to the 
malicious hacker's site. Since secure DNS has not been widely deployed in wireless computing, it 
would not be difficult to implement such a stealthy attack, providing the same look and feel of the 
Web site is as easy as downloading the target site Web pages. The insidious part of the attack involves 
discreetly changing dynamic information to the benefit of the malicious user or the detriment of the 
passenger. 
Data exchange 
While engaged in communication, wireless devices pass through many different, potentially non-
trustworthy networks to derive various services (Turisco, 2000).  While these services are realised, 
data are exchanged between the mobile user and the network. It is at this point that information can be 
stolen or altered without the mobile user's knowledge because of the visibility of the mobile user to 
the network. Further, transactions can be interrupted and then reinstated, often without proper 
authentication procedures which are usually strictly followed in a wired network (Schiller, 2000).  
This is because most vendor implementations of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or its wireless 
counterpart, Wireless Transport Security Layer (WTSL) do not follow rigorous authentication 
procedures or perform standard checks once a connection has been established.  Therefore, it is 
possible for a malicious attacker to redirect transaction requests without the user’s knowledge thereby 
gaining access to user’s information.  Further, most web sites are not currently configured to deal with 
intermittent service failures, which is common with wireless connections and malicious attackers can 
use this vulnerability to their advantage in wireless networks. 
Loss or theft 
Another risk unique to mobile devices is the risk of loss or theft of devices due to their small size 
(Loney, 2000). Without physical security provided in a traditional network environment, mobile 
computing devices are at increased risk of theft and loss, particularly given their small size. While the 
data stored on a misplaced device might be irreplaceable, other risks of lost Internet-enabled devices 
include the ability for finders of lost devices to access proprietary corporate systems, including email 
servers and file systems. One of the key problems with the current generation of handheld devices is 
the lack of good mechanisms to authenticate a particular user to a particular device. 
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Data security 
In addition to the issue of security, m-commerce applications introduce new and significant risks to 
data security. Users currently own their wireless devices such as cellular phones and PDAs.  As a 
result, users enter their personal data on these devices as they would on corporate machines. When a 
user establishes a connection using the protocols supporting mobile communications, the user’s data 
are revealed (Langley, 2000). In the current climate, major marketing and data collection firms track 
users' online Web usage by means of software programs similar to cookies. For example, in March 
2000, it was disclosed that AT&T Wireless and Sprint PCS were sending users' phone numbers to the 
Web sites they accessed from their Web-enabled wireless phones (Sausser, 2003). As a result, these 
Web sites can now track end users by personal identity information such as phone numbers as well as 
potentially using those phone numbers for offline direct telemarketing. 
Location id 
Other data risks involve using location identification devices (Haskin, 1999). Location-oriented 
services provide the ability to determine a user’s geographic location with a certain degree of 
precision, say within a range of 15 meters from the location of the mobile device. Therefore, it is 
possible to establish a user's geographic location.  This identification of location may cause potential 
security risks.  For instance, it is possible to steal data from a mobile device such as a mobile 
computer with wireless access based on this identification.  In the past, the media has reported that 
stock exchange details were stolen from executives who access this data in airport terminals by this 
method.   
WAP Gap Risk 
The proponents of wireless applications argue that the Wireless Transport Security Layer (WTLS) 
provides a secure infrastructure for applications development (Clarke, 2003).  When wireless requests 
are made to web pages of a network server, these requests are translated at the Wireless Application 
Protocol (WAP) gateway from the Wireless Transport Security Layer (WTSL) protocol to the 
standard Session Security Layer (SSL) protocol widely used in the secure Hyper Text Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) requests.  This process is commonly known as the “WAP Gap”. In the process of 
translating one protocol to another, the data is decrypted and then re-encrypted. If an attacker is able 
to have access to the mobile network at this point, then simply capturing the data when it is decrypted 
can compromise the security of the session.  
Malicious attackers tend to avoid the security provided by encryption protocols because of the 
strength of the perceived security elements of data encryption over communication channels.  
Therefore, these hackers tend to simply attack the weakest links in the system, such as servers and 
clients. There are currently few wireless gateways or portals to the wired Web. Thus, those few 
gateways present ideal targets of opportunity or single points of failure for an attacker to bring down a 
significant portion of the wireless Web by selective denial-of-service attacks. 
 
Platform security threats 
The basic infrastructure for running wireless applications is provided by the hardware platform.  
Therefore, without an infrastructure that fully supports security for computing applications on the 
device, achieving secure applications may not be possible (Schiller, 2000). In reality, the majority of 
the manufacturers of wireless devices has ignored this and has failed to include basic operating system 
security features.  This has, in turn, lead to insecure applications.  In general the failure to provide 
security features includes memory protection for processes, protected kernel rings, file access control, 
authentication of principals to resources, differentiated user and process privileges and biometrics 
authentication.  
Memory protection 
It is reported by Ghosh (2001) that one of the most popular PDA devices on the market does not 
provide memory protection for its applications and this has lead to serious threats for each 
application's own security and privacy. For instance, when a private key is used for a trusted 
application for the purpose of signing documents, attacks can be launched by a rogue application. The 
rogue application can attempt to steal the decrypted key in the signing application's memory by 
interrupting it at just the right moment.  To resolve these platform risks, appropriate memory 
protection needs to be enforced between applications to prevent one application from being able to see 
another.  
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Access control 
The second fundamental protection necessary is access control for objects to prevent unauthorised 
programs and users from accessing confidential data such as private keys or confidential information 
in databases (Stowe, 2000). Wireless PDA platforms should also support encrypted tunnels or virtual 
private networks to provide confidential access over insecure wireless links to corporate systems. 
Finally, strong authentication mechanisms such as fingerprint recognition systems should be built into 
the devices to authenticate the user to the device.  
 
Software security threats 
While the operating system provides the basic platform for wireless applications, the software 
applications that run on these devices are equally important. Assuming that basic platform services 
such as memory protection are provided to applications, it is possible to design and develop secure 
wireless applications using good software engineering and assurance methods. While the relation 
between software flaws and security vulnerabilities is well understood, it may still be possible to 
develop software applications with defects.   
Software defects 
The software defects or flaws in a mobile environment can occur in a number of ways (Stuart & 
Bawany, 2001).  Firstly, flaws in the logic of a program and in the implementation of the program can 
result in security holes that will be exploited by attackers or malicious Web sites. Secondly, low-level 
languages used for the development of applications for handheld devices may still contain common 
flaws such as buffer overflow flaws. Thirdly, the physical limitations of a wireless device may impose 
certain security and performance trade-offs. For instance, limited power, processing cycles, memory, 
and bandwidth will force application developers to forgo security features, such as encryption, in an 
effort to improve online performance. Fourthly, vendors may ignore security features available in 
advanced languages such as Java due to developmental time constraints. For instance, runtime 
checking of type safety is expensive both in programming time and testing time and developers of 
software applications for wireless devices may ignore this aspect.  Similarly, implementing fine-
grained sandboxes and stack-introspection, some of the standard security features implemented in 
current desktop domain, may be ignored due to time and cost constraints.  
Scripting 
In addition to the above potential software development defects, scripting can introduce other run-
time problems (Gururajan, 2001).  One of the most interesting software-related developments in 
wireless devices is the ability to send and execute mobile code. In the traditional desktop 
environment, using Java applets, it is possible to move ‘code’ between machines. Further, scripting is 
used extensively in Web pages to validate forms and create the look and feel of Web pages.  For 
several reasons, scripting will also have ample uses in the wireless Web. Client-side processing is 
attractive for reducing the number of communication hits necessary on extremely bandwidth-limited 
wireless links. For instance, client-side form validation reduces unnecessary server-side error reports 
and re-entry messages. Further, some server-side processing can be off-loaded to clients using mobile 
code that will increase the availability of servers to more simultaneous connections. In addition, 
scripting will be pervasive in wireless web computing for the same reason that it has become 
ubiquitous in wired Web pages: Web page development heavily leverages JavaScript for display 
functions and client-side transaction processing. 
In summary, mobile e-commerce systems will introduce (directly) new security risks beyond those 
currently found in desktop e-commerce systems. Using wireless devices for m-commerce will result 
in new vulnerabilities and potentially represents a new weak link in the development of m-commerce. 
Since attackers tend to exploit the weakest link in a chain, the security risks of wireless devices must 
be carefully analysed and addressed. 
 
INDIRECT THREATS 
 
In addition to the three broad categories discussed above, namely, data threats, platform threats and 
software threats, it is possible to identify a number of indirect threats in a mobile commerce 
environment.  For example, in a mobile communication environment the issue of privacy is discussed 
in great length due to the impact privacy has on users.  Similarly, details on regulatory implications 
6 
associated with mobile commerce can also be found in the literature.  These indirect threats have 
assumed importance in the recent months as they influence the adoption of the concept among users.  
These are discussed below. 
Privacy issues 
There is a general concern regarding the privacy of information available in an electronic commerce 
as well as mobile commerce environment (Shortliffe & Barnett, 2001).  For example, in August 2001, 
it was reported in the West Australian media that local councils parted with ratepayer information to 
certain building contractors.  While some council provided part information, other councils provided 
entire details such as house addresses, type of renovation undertaken etc.  Therefore, the question of 
how much information is private arises.  If ratepayers refuse to provide certain personal information, 
then local councils might restrict certain services. On the other hand, if certain personal details are 
given, authorities might disclose the information to other parties.  It appears that health data have been 
sold to pharmaceutical manufacturers in various countries for a sizeable amount without the consent 
of patients.  So, the issue of privacy assumes significance in mobile and electronic commerce 
environments.  
In mobile commerce environment, due to the nature of transmission, it is possible to capture various 
details about consumers and then store it for analysis purposes (Yampel & Eskenazi, 2001).  In recent 
reports, it has been highlighted the ease with which data can be stored during transmission in a 
wireless community. While the data is captured, the consumer may provide details of their personal 
life even without realizing the potential cause at a future point. Recent privacy issues involve children 
naively revealing their addresses or disclosing their parent’s credit card details or other sensitive 
information to unauthorized personnel.  This has also given raise to security issues.  Many vendors 
have raised this concern.  
In January 2000, it was reported in the Australian media that children who have access to mobile 
telephones used the services offered beyond their paying capabilities.  These children were sent 
accounts, which they were unable to pay, so the telephone companies considered their parents and/or 
guardians to be legally responsible for the debts and asked them to pay.  This has opened another 
interesting issue in terms of privacy.  How much information is private? Can we restrict or prohibit 
certain services based on certain criteria?  In this case, if we restrict the usage of mobile telephones, 
then in emergency situations, these children would have no access to help.  On the other hand, if we 
fail to restrict the use of these devices, the services are over used and payment difficulties result.   
The wireless technologies' surveillance capacity to collect, aggregate, analyse and distribute personal 
information coupled with current business practices have left individual privacy unprotected. While 
recent surveys and public pressure have raised the privacy consciousness of companies, particularly 
those operating online, individuals' information is frequently used and disclosed for purposes well 
beyond what the individual provided it for.  
It appears that in Australia privacy concerns are not fully resolved.  In Australia, all government 
agency web sites should contain a privacy statement or disclose their privacy policy.  It appears that 
this issue has not yet been fully resolved.  The privacy policy should detail what information a web 
site is going to collect, how it would be used and whether it would be disclosed to third parties, 
including other government agencies.   While this requirement gives a feeling that the consumers are 
guarded, making changes to existing policies on a web page or encouraging consumers to read those 
policies in practically not possible.  This will also not constitute ‘adequate notification’ as warranted 
in privacy legislation.  
In 1999, the Internet Industry Association of Australia produced an Internet Industry Code of Practice.  
One of the aims of that Code is to "establish confidence in and encourage the use of the Internet".  As 
part of that aim, the Code includes a requirement for all parties subscribing to the Code to provide 
details on their website of their Australian Company Number, their physical office address and 
contact telephone number, when entering into a transaction with a user.  It also includes a prohibition 
on engaging in conduct which is misleading or deceptive, unconscionable or exploitative. 
It is noteworthy to look at the weak state of privacy protections applied on documents.  The national 
laws protect private papers.   However, with the advent of home computers, individual diaries are 
moved to the desktop and to the hard drive.  Further, network computing allows individuals to rent 
space outside their home to store personal files and personal World Wide Web pages. Storing 
personal information on a remote server eliminates many of the privacy protections afforded in a 
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physical world.    In many countries, an individual's thoughts recorded electronically on a remote 
computer may be obtained from the service provider through a mere court order with no notice to the 
individual at all.  
The weak state of privacy protection is evident in the business setting too (Lee, 2000).  In the health 
industry, physicians are using intranets to enable the sharing of patient, clinical, financial, and 
administrative data.  Built on Internet technologies and protocols, the private networks link the 
hospital's information system to other associated systems such as the pharmacy systems.   In 
Australia, the government has access to the computer-based patient record system throughout the 
nation for financial assistance.  Further, private sector companies are moving to integrate this data 
with commercial ideas.    
Using wireless technologies, it is possible to move these records out of our doctor's offices using ad-
hoc networks formed for the purpose of consultation. While the use of network technology promises 
to bring information to the fingertips of medical providers when they need it most, privacy concerns 
are also raised because the identification schemes of persons who access these information sources is 
not fool-proof.    
In the absence of comprehensive national legislation to protect patient privacy, the legal protections 
afforded to individual’s data may vary greatly depending upon how the network is structured, where 
data is stored, and how long it is kept. If records are housed on the computer of an individual service 
provider such as a doctor, then access to that data will be governed by national legislation.  Law 
enforcement would be required to serve the individual service provider with a warrant and this service 
provider would receive notice and have the chance to halt an inappropriate search. Under national 
law, the consumer however, would receive no notice and have no opportunity to contest the 
production of the records. When information is in transit between a service provider and an 
organisation through a network, law enforcement's access is governed by the warrant requirements of 
the national electronic communications act.  In this case, neither the service provider nor the 
consumer receives prior or contemporaneous notice. If the records are stored on a server leased from 
an Internet service provider, the protections are unclear. They may be accessible by mere subpoena. If 
they are covered by the "remote computing" provisions of national telecommunications act, this 
would severely undermine privacy in the digital age.  
 
Regulatory Framework 
There is no international regulatory framework available to enforce certain security-related problems.  
For example, when there is a security breach, there are no clear guidelines as to the guarantee of 
security to consumers.  Further, when the security breach appears in an international transaction, the 
guidelines do not stipulate as to which country is responsible to prosecute the vandals.  
Reports (Green, 2000) indicate that consumers are worried about their privacy and the potential 
intrusion when mobile devices are used.  With certain financial transactions, consumers like to be 
anonymous, but this anonymity can be revealed in a mobile commerce environment because of 
location identification devices.  In areas such as health, revealing patient details may violate privacy 
regulations in certain countries.  While some governments are in the process of modifying their 
privacy laws, more work is needed to tighten the various loopholes caused by modern technologies.  
The following three issues – expectation of anonymity, control over personal information and 
expectation of confidentiality – will detail how privacy of an individual can be affected in a mobile 
commerce environment and how recent changes to privacy regulations safeguard individual privacy 
and potential security threat.    
 Anonymity  
There is a general expectation from individuals that their anonymity will be protected when they 
communicate over the Internet, irrespective of their method of connectivity (Koller, 2000).  If an 
individual has not actively disclosed information about himself or herself, then the expectation is that 
no one knows about the individual’s identity.  However, due to the possibilities of generation of an 
elaborate trail of data in the wireless arena, it is not always possible for an individual to assume that 
the anonymity is guaranteed.  The individual’s profile can be captured via transactional data, click 
stream data, or ‘mouse-droppings’, and this reveals an individual's online life.  
For example, in the connected medium, technologies such as "cookies," enable Web sites to 
surreptitiously collect information about one’s online activities and store it for future use. In a mobile 
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commerce environment, these cookies can be replaced with locator devices such as “Cell-Loc”.  
These locator devices are capable of identifying the location of a wireless device such as mobile 
telephones and hence its user.  It appears that these locator devices are so powerful and accurate that it 
is possible to identify a device with a precision of 15 metres from its location.  Initially, designed for 
the benign purpose of enabling employers to recognize an end user for responses, these locator 
devices are posing threat to one’s anonymity and hence privacy.  In a mobile commerce environment, 
these locator devices facilitate the tracking and monitoring of specific individual's activities.  The 
surreptitious collection of information about individual's activities, across multiple locations enabled 
through some locator device implementations, gained the attention of marketing professionals to 
target end users for online advertising.  
This has resulted in a battle being waged today, over the "location" information available through 
many cellular networks, foreshadowing the larger privacy considerations lurking in the vast data 
generated by individuals' use of wireless devices (Deise et al., 2000).  In the course of processing 
calls, many wireless communications systems collect information about the cell site and location of 
the person making or receiving a call.  Location information may be captured when the mobile device 
is merely on, even if it is not handling a call.  Both government and the private sector have their eye 
on this location information. While the government seeks to build added surveillance features into the 
network and ensure their access to the increasingly detailed data it captures, the private sector is 
considering how to use this new form of information. For example, a company in Japan is 
experimenting with a World Wide Web site that allows anyone to locate a phone, and the person 
carrying it, by merely typing in the phone number.  A newspaper aptly published this as ‘Cellular 
telephones, long associated with untethered freedom, are becoming silent leashes’.  It was also 
reported on 7 May 2001 in ‘The Australian’ that privacy laws warrant that companies get consumers’ 
consent prior to sending text advertisement messages to mobile phones.   This regulation is in 
operation in Australia now.  This regulation has opened up two major implications.  Firstly, 
companies who do not comply with this regulation will be asked to do so by the national privacy 
commissioner to change their policies.  Secondly, in more serious cases, where divulging personal 
details resulted in the loss of a job or discrimination, consumers could claim restitution in the civil 
courts.  Therefore, employers would have to safeguard, update and hand over personal information 
such as an individual’s resume and work history, including opinions about their ability, if requested 
by an employee.  The aim of this regulation was for consumers to control their personal information 
and the use of this personal information by private companies.  It also appears that consent would be 
the key to determine whether a breach has occurred or not.  
Control over Personal Information  
When individuals provide information during a transaction, for example to a doctor, they expect that 
the information collected will be used for the sole purpose of providing the service requested.  
Unfortunately, current practices, both offline and online, foil this expectation of privacy.  Information 
generated in the course of a business transaction is routinely used for a variety of other purposes 
without the individual's knowledge or consent.  There are instances where some entities go so far as to 
declare the information individuals provide them as company "property."  
There are multiple examples of companies using and disclosing personal information for purposes 
well beyond what the individual intended. For example, recent news stories in the US have focused 
the public on misuses of personal health information by the private sector, particularly when it is 
digitised, stored and manipulated.  
There are number of incidents where personal information of individuals is disclosed without any 
proper consent (Simpson, 2003).  For example, in 1996, Yahoo faced a public outcry over its People 
Search service. The service, jointly run with a marketing list vendor, would have allowed Net 
searchers to put an instant finger on 175 million people, all culled from commercial mailing lists. 
Later, Yahoo decided to delete 85 million records containing unlisted home addresses.  
During August of 1997, American Online ("AOL") announced plans to disclose its subscribers' 
telephone numbers to business partners for telemarketing.   AOL heard loud objections from 
subscribers and advocates opposed to this unilateral change in the "terms of service agreement" 
covering the use and disclosure of personal information.  In response, AOL decided not to follow 
through with its proposal.  At the beginning of the year, the Washington Post reported that several 
states had entered into agreements to sell state drivers' license photos to Image data. Under public 
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scrutiny the deal seemed quite different, state governors and legislatures quickly moved to block the 
contract.  In Australia, there is concern over the planned sale of patient’s health records collected 
through pharmaceutical institutions t o undisclosed commercial companies (reported in the Australian, 
27 February 2001). 
There are operational difficulties in the implementation of obtaining consent from consumers.  While 
most web sites use the ‘click’ method to acquire consent, the privacy laws appear to be aiming at 
more than this ‘click’ method.  Visitors to a web site might be confronted with an upfront explanation 
and then be required to click their consent at the end of each page of information display or at the end 
of each section, realising unnecessary delays every time information is provided.  Further, for auditing 
purposes, these keystrokes need to be logged and saved.   The National Electronic Authentication 
Council (NEAC) also has highlighted deficiencies in the current privacy laws relating to the 
relationship between parties involved in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  This issue is not yet fully 
addressed and only recently banking industries have accepted to follow a uniform PKIU policy. 
Confidentiality  
When individuals send an e-mail message, the expectation is that it will be read only by the intended 
recipient (Dang, 2000). Unfortunately, this expectation is not fully met by the existing wireless 
technology.  If an individual is using wireless devices provided by the organisation, then it is possible, 
and legal, for the employer to monitor these devices, leading to non-assurance of privacy.  Further, in 
a wireless environment, it is possible for a third party to capture the email, read, alter the contents and 
then transmit to the original recipient.   
While domestic law provides e-mail the same legal protection as a first class letter, the technology 
leaves unencrypted e-mail as vulnerable as a postcard (Lee, 2000). Compared to a letter, an e-mail 
message travels in a relatively unpredictable and unregulated environment.  In a wireless 
environment, due to intermediaries taking an active part in transmitting data, wireless emails can hop 
through a number of networks.  As it travels through these networks, wireless e-mail is handled by 
many independent entities, whereas a letter is handled only by the postal service. To further 
complicate matters, the e-mail message may be routed, depending upon traffic patterns, overseas and 
back, even if it is a purely domestic communication. While the message may effortlessly flow from 
nation to nation, the statutory privacy protections stop at the border because of domestic laws and 
their jurisdiction.  In addition, the Internet does not have central points of control and while the 
decentralised nature of the Internet allows it to cope with problems and failures in any given computer 
network, by simply routing in another direction, it also provides ample opportunities for those seeking 
to capture confidential communications.   Policy of a single computer network can compromise the 
confidentiality of information.  Users in mobile commerce environment can avoid these risks by 
implementing filters and other authentication techniques to avoid unauthorised access to their emails.  
 
Trust 
Trust is central to any commercial transaction and more so in the case of electronic commerce.  Trust 
is normally generated through relationships between transacting parties, familiarity with procedures, 
or redress mechanisms.  In the case of electronic commerce, the need for creating trust in the 
consumer is all the more important because of its virtual nature.  It hinges on assuring consumers and 
businesses that their use of network services is secure and reliable, that their transactions are safe, that 
they will be able to verify important information about transactions and the transacting parties such as 
origin, receipt, integrity of information, and identification.  Therefore the challenge is not to make e-
commerce fool-proof but to make the system reliable enough so that the value greatly exceeds the 
risk.  According to Fink (2000), there are three major issues as to why trust is very important for e-
commerce.  They are (1) the diverse nature of e-commerce (Mayer et al., 1995), (2) the extensive use 
of supply chain (Powell, 1997) and (3) the move towards self-directed work teams and the 
empowerment of workers (Hope-Ross, 2001).  OECD in its report2 entitled ‘Dismantling the Barriers 
of Global Electronic Commerce’  has listed building trust as one of the key aspects that would require 
more attention.   
Hitherto, governments have played a major role in helping to create trust in economic transactions.  
But, in this rapidly changing information technology era, the private sector plays an increasingly 
                                                 
2  More information can be found at: OECD web site http://www.oecd/org/dsti/sti/it/ec/prod/dismantl.htm 
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important role.  Industry is called upon to develop technological solutions to meet the needs of 
businesses and consumers for different levels of security, certification, privacy and consumer redress.  
Governments are attempting to implement technology-neutral policies in order not to limit mobile 
commerce (including electronic commerce) business transactions 
(http://www.oecd/org/dsti/sti/it/ec/prod/dismantl.htm).  According to Fink (2000), creating Web trust 
is more important because the parties are not in physical proximity and cannot observe body 
language.   
Any new development in technology in today’s consumer minds creates both curiosity as well as 
reluctance.  Fink (Fink, 1998) stated that the informality and lack of overall control creates the 
perception that the Internet is inherently insecure. Business risks, such as products and services, 
inadequate legal provisions, reliability of trading partners, behaviour of staff and the demise of 
Internet service providers, and technological risks such as hackers, computer viruses, data interception 
and misrepresentation are all increasing.  To achieve a satisfactory level of trust, one has to manage 
both the business and the technological risks.  Fink (2000, p.38) suggests that the collective trust 
requirement for e-commerce can be met by one or more of three forms of trust, namely deterrence-, 
knowledge-, and identification-based trust.  He further states that currently e-commerce relies mostly 
on knowledge-based trust, as in the case of EDI systems that are useful for Business-to-Business 
commerce.  However, there is now a surge in identification-based trust which is provided by security 
guaranteeing organisations such as WebTrust whose seal of trust indicates to the consumer that the 
particular Web site has a high level of security and integrity.  Specifically, Web Trust addresses three 
broad areas of risk with electronic commerce, these are business practices, transaction integrity and 
information protection.  But when trust is not fully guaranteed in the wired medium through which e-
commerce currently operates, how is it possible to guarantee trust in a wireless medium?  For 
instance, the current architecture for wireless communications does not provide full trust in terms of 
transaction integrity.  Some of the models envisaged for m-commerce are based on a smart card 
approach and hence the issue of trust needs greater examination in m-commerce.   
 
Access to and Use of Infrastructure  
Despite the technical development, access to the infrastructure on which m-commerce is to be 
developed is essential.  Some of the major issues related to access and use of infrastructure are: 
technical neutrality, skills, radio-frequency availability and the cost associated with services (Schiller, 
2000).   
The concept of technology neutrality refers to the availability of technology for the implementation of 
various services to facilitate e- and m-commerce.  For instance, encryption techniques differ between 
countries and there are no government regulations to stipulate a neutral technology to facilitate 
international transactions.  While there is a minimum standard available, the neutrality of such 
standards is questioned.  Such differences will hinder development (Ross, 2000).   
Skills in IT are a worldwide problem.  When new technologies are introduced, users need to acquire 
skills to use these technologies.  In addition to this, skills are needed to develop the technology.  
Despite the publicity about mobile computing since 1994, and the existence wireless applications 
since 1998, consumer products are not freely available.  This is a concern (Ridge, 1999).   
The question of operating frequency for wireless communication and hence  
m-commerce is a confusing issue.  There are three groupings available in terms of use of radio 
frequency.  For instance, the standard 2.4 M frequency is used free of cost in a number of countries. 
Countries such as France, which operate their military radio frequency at this level, do not allow use 
of this radio frequency.  Consumers will be affected by this (Sausser, 2003).   
Due to the infant stages of both e-commerce and m-commerce, the issue of cost has not been fully 
explored.  Despite the availability of certain economic models for Internet pricing, the cost of 
infrastructure to facilitate such services has not been fully examined.  Such an examination throws a 
number of questions open: Who is going to pay the cost – businesses or consumers or governments?  
How does the pricing mechanism evolve – based on volume or transaction?  These questions are yet 
to be raised fully and answered and until such time that they are, the development and hence the 
implementation of the m-commerce domain is not fully complete.   
 
Government Concerns 
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In the m-commerce environment, governments are concerned with regulatory frameworks.  The 
United Nation’s UNCITRAL Model Law serves the basis for a number of countries to modify their 
existing laws to accommodate e-commerce.  When m-commerce is realised, these laws will need to 
undergo further revision to suit m-commerce applications, their implementations and consumers.  
Some of the concerns governments are currently facing are the international regulatory framework, 
encryption standards, technology neutrality, digital currency backup and the provision of intermediary 
services to support m-commerce development especially in the communications arena.   
Jurisdictional Issues 
Just as electronic commerce opens up new opportunities for international trade, it also opens up new 
questions regarding the application of laws to transactions conducted wholly or partially on-line.  The 
ACCC has already noted an increase in complaints received from Australian consumers regarding 
products and services purchased from other countries as well as complaints from overseas consumers 
about products purchased from Australia.  Consumer complaints regarding purchases made over the 
Internet from overseas entities are difficult to resolve on an individual basis because of questions 
about jurisdiction, enforceability and resultant costs and delays.  Regulations such as the place of 
transaction and the law of contract are made obsolete by the borderless nature of the Internet.  
Unscrupulous traders will find it easy to avoid regulation in the electronic marketplace without a 
cooperative global approach to these issues (Freeman, 2003). 
Taxation 
In Australia, the viability of electronic commerce will be at least partially determined by the tax 
regime.  The US has taken the position that there should be "no discriminatory taxation against 
Internet commerce".  In particular, it advocates that the Internet should be a tariff-free zone.  But the 
Australian Tax Office (ATO) Report3  of 1999 notes that the tariff-free policy advocated by the US 
does not extend to tangible products ordered and paid for on-line but delivered in the conventional 
manner.   
The ATO Report follows an extensive review of the impact of electronic commerce on the Australian 
taxation system.  The Report is intended to stimulate further discussion at both national and 
international levels, prior to formulating the ATO's final recommendations to the Australian 
government.  The Report states that the key principles of international taxation, such as source of 
income, residency and place of permanent establishment are "seriously challenged" by the emergence 
of electronic commerce. 
Some of the key findings mentioned in the report include: 
• The lack of legal infrastructure 
• A reliable and easy electronic payment system 
• The varying impact of the taxation system of e-commerce 
• The application of jurisdiction, and 
• Encryption difficulties in terms of Crime and Tax Evasion. 
The Report makes a number of recommendations on the basis of these findings.  Of particular 
relevance is the need for international consultation and cooperation with respect to the regulation of 
electronic commerce and the enforcement of taxation laws.  The Report also recognises that taxation 
policies associated with electronic commerce should be developed in cooperation with other federal 
government agencies who are currently examining a range of other issues related to the on-line 
environment. 
The Report recognises that "the ATO should be sensitive to the effect of e-commerce regulation on 
the nascent Internet commerce industry in Australia".  It also makes a number of recommendations for 
the industry that may be regarded as controversial.  For example, the ATO advocates the licensing of 
both `web shops' and organisations that operate or host web shops.  In order to ensure a greater degree 
of control over tax reporting a framework to monitor commercial Internet traffic should be 
established.  As part of this process, a record of the range of IP addresses assigned to Australian based 
computers should be maintained and the reporting requirements relating to a 'cash dealer' under the 
Financial Transactions Reports Act 1988 should be reviewed to capture digital cash transactions.  The 
ATO should also negotiate with software manufacturers regarding the inclusion of some form of 'date 
                                                 
3 The report can be found in ATO’s web site www.ato.gov.au 
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stamping' or other means of ensuring the integrity of transactional records in software used for 
electronic commerce.  The Report also recommends that major international credit card and other 
electronic payment system providers should be requested to provide access to transaction records held 
outside Australia.  The efficient functioning of electronic commerce requires all of these issues to be 
dealt with in ways that are both technology neutral and which have worldwide endorsement and 
recognition. 
International harmony is another aspect that needs consideration.  Due to implementation issues, 
national laws may differ from international regulations in certain cases.  For instance, custom 
regulations in certain countries demand print medium while in certain other countries electronic 
documents are allowed.  In addition to this, the implementation of regulations differs from country to 
country, for example, in the area of encryption,.  This variation can cause potential problems in 
technology use and access.  Thus, international harmony is important in e-commerce and in 
developing m-commerce.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While many of the risks of desktop computing will be found in wireless computing, the nature of the 
wireless medium requires a degree of trust and cooperation between member nodes in networks.  If 
this cooperation is not guaranteed, then a malicious user can exploit the weakness in order to either 
deny service or collect confidential information or disseminate false information. Furthermore, the 
platforms and languages being developed for wireless devices appear to have failed to adopt the 
fundamental security concepts employed in the current generation of desktop machines. Probably the 
most significant risk could be from malicious code that is beginning to penetrate wireless networks, 
and which has the ability to undermine other security technologies such as signing, authentication, 
and encryption because it runs resident to the device with all the privileges of the owner. The security 
threats presented by malicious mobile scripts to wireless computing also appear to be significant. 
Therefore, device manufacturers and language developers for wireless applications should attempt to 
produce secure operating system models and secure models of computation before going forward with 
business-critical and privacy-related wireless applications.  
Apart from the direct threats, in the current climate, the indirect threats are also assuming importance 
due to issues such as amendments to privacy regulations.  Therefore, attention needs to be paid in 
order to monitor and control the indirect issues discussed in this paper.  Otherwise, we are expected to 
repeat the mistakes of the past, and potentially take two steps backward as we move one step forward.     
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